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[186] 
TOWARDS OPTIMAL LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: 
LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
PROPOSALS OF 2020 
 




Are the E.U.’s proposals on artificial intelligence (AI) a major breakthrough 
or just a mere token of an initial liability regime? Several initiatives have 
been released in 2020 to shape Europe’s digital future to the next level, 
whereas the U.S. leadership program is hesitant to regulate AI. However, the 
recent E.U. proposals by introducing strict liability or implementing a 
certification procedure are a first approximation of what is needed rather than 
an adoptable bill. Based on the lessons learned from the E.U. a scheme of 
liability is outlined, which strengthens the trajectory of AI’s development in 
the long-term solely when it is socially desirable. AI is characterized by self-
learning, opacity and autonomy, and its increasing ubiquity will put greater 
strain on the liability system. Therefore, this contribution considers the 
impacts of AI on U.S.’s major liability regimes, analyzes the effects of its 
application, and develops a flexible system for risky AI systems. Overall, a 
fundamental challenge of tort law raised by AI is examined: based on the 
question of whether the applicable U.S. tort law doctrines are capable of 
setting proper incentives for the usage of AI for society. The influence of AI 
on liability rules will be felt along two margins: First, to avoid application 
difficulties, adjustments must be made to existing rules; otherwise, legal 
uncertainty will be enhanced. Second, there is not a single existing liability 
regime which is capable of governing AI in a socially optimal manner. This 
contribution indicates that the U.S. and E.U. neglect important opportunities 
to reduce the risks of AI and enhance AI’s innovation on account of their 
 
* Mag. iur., Research Associate at the University of Bremen, Germany and at the Karl-
Franzens-University of Graz, Austria. I am deeply grateful to Professor Patrick C. Leyens for 
his support and invaluable comments. Thanks to participants of workshops at the University 
of Bremen hosted by Professor Patrick C. Leyens and at the University of Graz hosted by 
Professor Walter Doralt for their comments on this project. Special thanks are also due to the 
editors of the Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal for their careful edits. All 
opinions, errors, and omissions are my own. 
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liability rules or new proposals. However, the U.S. already noted that the 
global AI race is underway. Hereinafter, a first roadmap is outlined that leads 
to a leading position. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
raises the fundamental issue that “robots cannot be sued, but they can cause 
devastating damage.”1 Litigation of harm caused by AI systems has already 
attracted the attention of courts.2 Now, the duty of AI in society needs further 
clarification. Several recent E.U. declarations indicate that the European 
strategy tends to address this subject by striking a balance between, 
efficiently and fairly protecting potential victims of harm, and on the other 
hand, promoting innovation of the new technology by companies.3 To some 
parts, this contribution emphasizes that efficiency analysis is capable of 
reasonably demonstrating such a socially desirable equilibrium.4 Thus, the 
following focuses on liability rules which best incentivize safe and efficient 
technological innovations for AI. However, from a long-term perspective the 
E.U. attempts are failing to achieve such a balance. The U.S. is in charge of 
making use of these findings. Further, it has been argued that the common 
law system in particular is oriented along the efficiency-enhancing path and 
therefore, predestined to pursue the aforementioned balance.5 Still, as 
 
1 United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979 (3d Cir. 1984). 
2 Artificial Intelligence Litigation: Can the Law Keep Pace with The Rise of the Machines?, 
QUINNEMANUEL, https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/article-december-
2016-artificial-intelligence-litigation-can-the-law-keep-pace-with-the-rise-of-the-machines/ 
(showing that several courts have already dealt with the AI related technologies) (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2021). 
3 See Resolution on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
(Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter E.U. Draft Bill], 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0276_EN.html; White Paper 
on Artificial Intelligence: A European approach to excellence and trust, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, at 2–3 (Feb. 19, 2020) [hereinafter E.U. White Paper], 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-
feb2020_en.pdf. 
4 One remark needs to be stressed, this contribution is aware of the fact that social welfare or 
efficiency is not the only fundamental aspect to align an AI framework. For instance, also 
privacy, data protection or ethical standards need to be addressed properly. See generally 
Horst Eidenmüller, Machine Performance and Human Failure: How Shall We Regulate 
Autonomous Machines?, 15 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109, 124–132 (2019) (explaining that human 
rights only belong to humans). 
5 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39–40 (1993) (“[T]he theory that the 
common law and other areas of judge-made law are on the whole efficiency-enhancing.”); 
See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) 
(explaining the theory that cases of more efficient rules settle more often than cases with less 
of efficient rules); See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of 
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technological advances have outpaced legislative adjustments, it is unclear 
if existing U.S. liability regimes are capable of promoting socially optimal 
behavior. Certainly, the interaction between tort law doctrines and AI poses 
questions that will shape the future of mankind within the coming decades.6 
Countries across the globe are investing enormous amounts into the 
development of AI.7 In February 2020, the E.U. reaffirmed that it is essential 
to attract more than $20 billion per year in total investment in AI throughout 
the E.U. over the next decade.8 Remarkably, the U.S. budget for AI is also 
increasing and is on a path to double that amount by 2022.9 However, as 
more funding is made available for AI technology, AI will be more widely 
distributed; therefore, more losses will occur. Thus, liability law is in charge 
of establishing an optimal outcome for society. If the liability threat is too 
high or too low, the technology will not be optimally used , rather it will 
either be overused or underused or even withheld. Such consequences are 
suboptimal for society since AI promises to solve some of the world's present 
biggest challenges: from predicting disease outbreaks or reducing fatality 
rates in traffic accidents to fighting climate change or anticipating 
 
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (explaining that within the demonstrated model 
inefficient rules would lead to more efficient rules because there would be more litigated 
cases. More inefficiency means greater effort for high-level litigants). 
6 Cf. Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans, 27 OXFORD LEGAL STUD. 
RSCH. PAPER 1 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001. 
7 See Keith Kirkpatrick, Artificial Intelligence Market Forecasts, OMDIA (Dec. 23, 2019) 
(stating that AI software revenues are estimated to grow from $10.1 billion in 2018 to $126 
billion in 2025), https://omdia.tech.informa.com/OM000840/Artificial-Intelligence-Market-
Forecasts; see also Anand S. Rao and Gerard Verweij, Sizing the prize: What’s the real value 
of AI for your business and how can you capitalize? PWC (stating that AI may boost global 
GDP by 14% or $15.7 trillion by 2030), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-
report.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
8 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 5; Communication on Artificial Intelligence for 
Europe, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, at 6 (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-237-F1-EN-MAIN-
PART-1.PDF; Communication on Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, at 3 (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-795-F1-EN-MAIN-
PART-1.PDF. 
9 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, President Trump’s FY 2021 Budget Commits 
to Double Investments in Key Industries of the Future, (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-fy-2021-
budget-commits-double-investments-key-industries-future/. 
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cybersecurity threats.10 Hence, if there is no long-term roadmap the effort 
put into AI development will fizzle out quickly. 
The urgent need to investigate the applicability of the liability 
framework regarding AI systems appears to be evident. Tech leaders, like 
Google or Microsoft, have already called for AI rules.11 The U.S., due to its 
statement of global leadership in AI matters,12 ought to be in the lead to meet 
the demands of the economic operators. It has been argued that tort law 
especially has played a more important role in the U.S. legal system than in 
those of other technologically advanced nations.13 Even though U.S. liability 
rules appear predestined to govern AI, proclaimed U.S. policy initiatives do 
not meet such expectations. When examining the governmental strategies for 
AI in comparison to the liability regimes of the U.S. and the E.U. 
considerable differences arise. Whereas the U.S. established general AI 
guidelines and principles,14 such as the recent draft memorandum in January 
 
10 See OECD, Using artificial intelligence to help combat COVID-19, (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=130_130771-3jtyra9uoh&title=Using-artificial-
intelligence-to-help-combat-COVID-19; Report on the safety and liability implications of 
Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, at 2 (Feb. 
19, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/commission-report-safety-and-liability-
implications-ai-internet-things-and-robotics-0_en. 
11 See Roberto Torres, At Davos, tech leaders call for AI regulation, CIO DIVE (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.ciodive.com/news/at-davos-tech-leaders-call-for-ai-regulation/570768/; see 
Monica Nickelsburg, Microsoft President Brad Smith calls for AI regulation at Davos, 
GEEKWIRE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.geekwire.com/2020/microsoft-president-brad-
smith-calls-ai-regulation-davos/; See Press Conference: How to Implement Responsible AI, 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/events/world-
economic-forum-annual-meeting-2020/sessions/ai-framework. 
12 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, Accelerating America’s Leadership in 
Artificial Intelligence, (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/accelerating-americas-leadership-in-artificial-
intelligence/. 
13 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 126-28 
(2001). 
14 See White House, supra note 12; See also Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and 
the Fog of Innovation: A Deep-Dive on Governance and the Liability of Autonomous Systems, 
35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 42–44 (2019). 
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2020.15 The E.U.,16 on the other hand, took a different approach by 
announcing substantive considerations on liability rules solely governing 
AI.17 First, in February 2020 a White Paper by the E.U. proposed a 
distinction between high-risk and non-high-risk AI systems as well as prior 
conformity assessment procedure.18 Second, in October 2020 an in-depth 
Resolution was published, which included a draft bill on a “civil liability 
regime for [AI]”.19 In summary, the initiative suggests strict liability 
combined with the defense of comparative negligence for high-risk AI 
systems throughout the entire E.U.20 
This contribution eschews issues of how society should deal with the 
challenges of ethical questions that AI evokes,21 it neither treats AI’s own 
legal personality.22 Instead, the “crucial issue”23 of harm caused by AI is 
 
15 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, Memorandum for the heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies: Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Application, 
(Jan. 7, 2020) (focusing on a trustworthy development, testing, deployment, and adoption of 
AI), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Draft-OMB-Memo-on-
Regulation-of-AI-1-7-19.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2021) [hereinafter U.S. Draft Mem.]; See 
generally WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, American Artificial Intelligence 
Initiative Year One Annual Report, (Feb. 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/American-AI-Initiative-One-Year-Annual-Report.pdf. 
16 Due to simplification, the running text does not differentiate between the institutions of the 
E.U., such as European Commission or European Parliament. 
17 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3. 
18 E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 5. 
19 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3. 
20 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4 & Art. 10. 
21 See, e.g., Iria Giuffrida, Liability for AI Decision-Making: Some Legal and Ethical 
Considerations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 439, 453-56 (2019) (comparing the different approaches 
by the E.U. and U.S.); See also High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence Ethics 
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 2019), (developing four main 
principles of AI: respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm, fairness and explicability), 
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation; DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for 
Artificial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethical-
principles-for-artificial-intelligence/. 
22 See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.: Personhood for Autonomous Systems?, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 591 (2019); Dalton Powell, Autonomous Systems as Legal Agents: Directly 
by the Recognition of Personhood or Indirectly by the Alchemy of Algorithmic Entities, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 306 (2020), https://dltr.law.duke.edu/2020/04/17/autonomous-
systems-as-legal-agents-directly-by-the-recognition-of-personhood-or-indirectly-by-the-
alchemy-of-algorithmic-entities/. 
23 Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-
8-2017-0005_EN.html?redirect#title1. 
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examined. The following cuts through the confusion about the extent to 
which the European draft bill achieves the objective of a more efficient AI 
usage. In order to do so, the losses caused by AI systems under various 
liability regimes are compared. In brief, as will be elaborated below, when 
losses are caused between several AI operators neither a single current U.S. 
tort law doctrine nor the new E.U. initiatives are capable of providing 
socially optimal behavior. The lessons learned lead to an approach, which 
governs AI in a beneficial way. 
The aforementioned suggests five different stages of the enquiry. In Part 
II, the first conclusion is drawn – the necessity of a distinction between high-
risk AI systems and non-high-risk AI systems depending on a 
probability/magnitude test. Even though the approach taken by the E.U. is 
fairly indeterminate and vague, the basic idea of a risk-based approach shall 
be endorsed. But the forceful European call for a regulatory certification 
procedure before an AI system is placed on the market should not be 
endorsed. Instead, civil liability should be the center of interest. 
In Part III, selected doctrinal errors for assigning the major U.S. liability 
rules to AI are indicated. The exemplified uncertainty over the applicability 
of such rules may even hamper the innovation of AI. Further, in order to 
design the optimal liability system from scratch, the different incentives of 
conventional tort law doctrines and the E.U.’s new civil liability proposal are 
analyzed. Ultimately, neither one of the current major liability regimes nor 
the E.U. proposal is able to achieve a desirable outcome. On the contrary, 
only the basic approach of the E.U. might be adoptable. Since the European 
draft bill seems not flexible enough, it can be considered as flawed overall. 
In Part IV, the lessons learned from the European proposals 
accompanied by improvements are illustrated. In doing so, strict liability 
with the defense of comparative negligence can be invoked as a basis for an 
AI framework. As the main lesson from the E.U.’s attempts to govern AI, it 
can be noted that (so far) no socially desirable solution has been achieved. 
In Part V, the article presents a scheme of liability for AI systems that 
would desirably control the associated risks of AI. The economic operators 
involved are now strictly liable, but instead of compensating the other party, 
payments of the caused damage are made to the state. In their financial self-
interest AI deployers would now act only when it is socially desirable. This 
solution is challenged by many difficulties, but the prospects of the new 
technology promise the capability of its application and enforcement. 
Finally, a roadmap is provided that demonstrates first steps of how an 
AI liability regime of efficiency and trustworthiness can be promoted 
throughout the U.S. landscape. 
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II. DIFFERENT RULES FOR DIFFERENT RISKS OF AI 
In the U.S., no general governmental definition of AI yet exists.24 The 
E.U. – finally – came forward with a definition for the purposes of any 
possible future discussion on policy initiatives. In sum, three crucial 
elements of AI result from the definition: self-learning, autonomy, and 
opacity.25 AI systems with these characteristics are addressed in the 
following of this contribution. As a result, the lack of transparency leads ex 
ante to a limited predictability of the AI system’s behavior and ex post to a 
limited explainability – the so-called black box effect.26 On the basis of these 
three key elements, a – final – common language for international debates 
on AI shall be established.27 
 
A. DISTINCTION: HIGH-RISK AI SYSTEM OR NOT 
The first thesis developed in this contribution is that a distinction within 
the liability framework for AI has to be specifically risk-based. As one of the 
leading tech companies, IBM has already strongly advocated in favor of a 
policy which emphasizes the significance of different rules for different risks 
of AI.28 The risk-based approach in the context of AI was already mentioned 
in discussions but has not been in-depth examined so far.29 
A stiff framework does not seem desirable at all. For instance, the author 
firmly believes that robo-advisors which can be described as provision of 
 
24 See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Sec. 238(g) 
of the (Public Law 115-232; 10 U.S.C. 2358 note) (serving as guideline of reference); See 
Sofia Samoili et al., AI Watch: Defining Artificial Intelligence, JRC TECHNICAL REPORTS 
(2020) (analyzing 55 key documents of definitions on AI); but see Bryan Casey & Mark A. 
Lemley, You Might Be a Robot, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 287 (2020) (arguing that there might 
not be the ‘right’ definition). 
25 E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 16; See also High-Level Expert Group on Artificial 
Intelligence Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation. 
26 See generally Davide Castelvecchi, Can we open the black box of AI?, NATURE INT’L 
WEEKLY J. OF SCI. (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-
of-ai-1.20731; Alex John London, Artificial Intelligence and Black-Box Medical Decisions: 
Accuracy Versus Explainability, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 15, 15–17 (2019). 
27 See Int 1894-2020, City Council (N.Y. 2020). 
28 Precision Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, IBM POLICY LAB (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/ai-precision-regulation/. 
29 See, e.g., Yavar Bathaee, Artificial Intelligence Opinion Liability, 35 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 
113, 162–63 (2020) (arguing that sectors of health care or public defense are high-risk 
applications. Although a further explanation on how to determine high-risk AI is missing). 
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investment advice or portfolio management services,30 and autonomous 
traffic management systems should not be treated equally under the law. The 
former is based on a contractual relationship (voluntary creditors); generally 
affected parties can be determined almost conclusively. Whereas traffic 
management systems expose risks on third parties, who are often not aware 
of the operating AI system; thus, no contractual or legal relationship towards 
the AI operator exists (involuntary creditors).31 
A general distinction related to the riskiness of an AI system seems thus 
mandatory. Further, legislative intervention is obligatory where the 
technology exposes many third persons to a risk, and current rules might not 
impose socially desirable incentives.32 However, due to the possibility of 
insurance, the sole aspect of a large amount of losses would not raise any 
concerns.33 Instead, the decisive factor is the assessment of the probability 
of the damage. The unpredictability of AI adds further complexity to 
calculating the probability of an event occurring and its impact. So, the more 
significant the criticality in terms of an AI system, the more virulent the 
urgency of laws which are capable of inducing injurers to internalize the 
entire harm caused seems to be. 
However, clear parameters are required to distinguish between the 
relevant forms of AI. On one hand, if affected persons by AI are easy to 
predict or contract voluntarily under consideration of the technology, such 
AI systems ought to be categorized as non-high-risk AI. Robo-advisors 
might be classified as non-high-risk. On the other hand, if the majority of 
affected persons by AI are difficult to predict ex ante and no contractual 
relationship exists, such AI systems should be categorized as high-risk AI. 
An autonomous traffic management system where various pedestrians, 
passengers and drivers are involved might be identified as high-risk. 
 
30 See generally Facundo Abraham et al., Robo-Advisors: Investing through Machines, 21 
WORLD BANK RSCH AND POL’Y BRIEFS 1, 1–4 (2019). 
31 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 50–54 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541–
43 (9th ed. 2014). 
32 Concerning the malfunctioning of the liability system, see Part III.  
33 There is hardly any hazardous activity that is not insurable for the largest assumed accident. 
As can be demonstrated by the insurance of nuclear accidents, see generally U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFF., REP. TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, Nuclear Regulation: NRC’S 
Liability Insurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants Owned by Limited Liability 
Companies (May 2004). 
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Now, the E.U. proposed a risk-based classification between the 
aforementioned two levels of risk for AI,34 namely (i) non-high-risk and (ii) 
high-risk AI. In general, the risk differentiation of AI should be endorsed and 
follows the exemplified probability/magnitude test. Still, several proposed 
attempts by the E.U. are flawed. 
To qualify as high risk, the E.U. suggested two criteria which have to be 
cumulative met. Otherwise, the AI system is considered as non-high-risk. 
First, the AI application has to be employed in a specifically listed high-
risk sector. The sectoral categorization of high-risk AI should be reviewed 
and updated periodically where necessary.35 The effectiveness of such an 
enumerative list of sectors seems questionable. A public authority has to 
define the high-risk sectors ex ante, before the AI system is placed on the 
market and causes harm. 
Deploying the basic concept of rules vs. standards on AI’s risk 
determination in order to decide if a legal command should be promulgated 
as rule or standard.36 In doing so, factors facilitating the decision-making 
process on a law’s shape of AI will guide them to a standard rather than to a 
detailed rule. One aspect is that AI systems are subject to a frequent change 
of conditions as well as continual development and improvement by leading 
companies throughout the industry which may result in information 
asymmetries between public authorities and private actors.37 The approach 
 
34 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 17; E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4 & 8; See 
also Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging technologies, EUROPEAN EXPERT 
GRP. ON LIABILITY AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES, at 40 (May 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeeting&meet
ingId=15470&Lang=EN. In principle, such a risk-based approach is nothing new, see, e.g., 
ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 
81–86, 281–95 (2d ed. 2012). 
35 E.g. sectors of transportation (such as autonomous vehicles, traffic management systems or 
unmanned aircraft) or assistance (such as autonomous robots or public places cleaning 
devices); See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 17; E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at (14). 
This suggestion reaffirms the aforementioned policy by IBM supra note 28. 
36 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992). 
37 Already in 2017, global players such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Nvidia and IBM 
account for 40% of open AI positions, see Stacy Jones, Automation Jobs Will Put 10,000 
Humans to Work, Study Says, FORTUNE (May 1, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/05/01/automation-jobs-will-put-10000-humans-to-work-study-
says/. Additionally, the most prized AI researchers are aggressively recruited by large 
companies and they buy up promising AI startups before they get off the ground to ensure 
their primacy, see Cade Metz, The Battle for Top AI Talent Only Gets Tougher From Here, 
WIRED (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/intel-just-jumped-fierce-
competition-ai-talent/. 
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of detailed sectors might become obsolete at a fast rate. In the long run, it 
does not seem realistic that a precise rule will keep up with the pace of the 
technology; thus, standards are superior when there is a fast rate of 
modifications.38 Further, the more complex an environment is, the more 
costly it is to establish a functioning norm. At present, the characteristics of 
AI make it almost impossible to cover every possible divergence; thus, 
standards are capable of governing several possible contingencies ex post.39 
Indeed, the ongoing distribution of AI will result in a frequency of 
application, which generally favors the implementation of rules.40 But AI has 
a tremendous range of variation; thus, standards are more beneficial because 
little repetition of the same circumstances occurs.41 In sum, the rule-based 
approach by the E.U. does not seem socially desirable; the enumerative 
denomination of sectors could lead to situations where high-risk AI 
applications are not covered. 
Second, the E.U. suggests that significant risks must be likely to 
materialize within the respective sector in order to be classified as high-risk 
AI. The significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the 
severity of possible harm, the likelihood that the risk occurs and the 
procedure in which the AI system is used. Further, high-risk AI systems 
potentially endanger the public to a much higher degree and in a manner that 
is impossible to predict in advance.42 The assignment to determine how 
significant the potential risk of an AI system might result in crucial 
difficulties. Even though such concerns of defining and assessing risk are 
nothing unfamiliar,43 the broad range of AI operations makes several sectors 
potentially capable of creating significant harm to the general public. For 
example, even though autonomous high-frequency trading is not capable of 
 
38 Cf. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 621–22; Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Legal Rules and Standards, at 
2 (2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=999860. 
39 Cf. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, On the optimal specificity of legal rules, 3 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 147, 151–52 (2007). 
40 Cf. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 563. 
41 Cf. Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in V ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 502, 510–11 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
42 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 17–18; E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at (13); 
European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 40. 
43 See generally Baldwin et al., supra note 34, at 86–98 (mentioning that the core concern of 
risk studies is to define how risks should be, perceived, quantified, and responded to); ORTWIN 
RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 12–45 (2008); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2006). 
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hurting someone’s physical integrity, flash crashes44 can still drive a myriad 
of people into financial bankruptcy. 
In order to be classified as high-risk the E.U. emphasizes that both 
criteria must be cumulatively met; unless these are fulfilled, the AI system 
has to be subsumed as non-high-risk. In October 2020, the E.U. published a 
draft bill including a first attempt to form a definition in Art. 3 (c), which 
clearly indicates the issues addressed above.45 Overall, the E.U. concept of a 
differentiation between high-risk and non-high-risk AI can offer a solid 
baseline for further deliberations even beyond Europe. In sum, the desirable 
legislative path ought to be risk-based: a framework must depend on the 
riskiness of the AI system. A concrete solution is however anything but 
simple question to solve and goes well beyond the ability to discuss in this 
context. 
To be clear, where AI systems impose high risks the potential of 
decreasing these risks is significantly large. Whereas when the associated 
risks are low, there is only little room for an already low risk to be 
decreased.46 As a first priority, it seems legitimate to reduce the most severe 
risk that society is facing, i.e. high-risk AI systems. Accordingly, the 
following contribution only focuses on the governance of high-risk AI 
systems. 
 
B. PRE-CERTIFICATION OF HIGH-RISK AI 
According to the E.U., it is necessary to verify and ensure that high-risk 
AI systems comply with certain requirements, before placing it on the 
market. To achieve certification five key features must be satisfied in a 
specific manner by high-risk AI systems, namely: training data; data and 
record-keeping; information to be provided; robustness and accuracy; as well 
as human oversight.47 Such a prior conformity assessment procedure ought 
 
44 See generally Elvis Jarnecic & Mark Snape, The Provision of Liquidity by High-Frequency 
Participants, 49 FINANC. REV. 371 (2014); Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The 
Impact of High Frequency Trading in an Electronic Market, 72 J. FINANCE 967 (2017); See 
also the classic book by MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014). 
45 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 3 (c) (“‘high risk’ means a significant potential in 
an autonomously operating AI-system to cause harm or damage to one or more persons in a 
manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance; the significance of the potential 
depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm or damage, the likelihood that 
the risk materializes and the manner in which the AI-system is being used”). 
46 Cf. Steven Shavell, The Mistaken Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon Activities, 10 
J. LEG. ANALYSIS 1, 19 (2018). 
47 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 18–22. 
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to include checks of the algorithms and of the data sets by a competent 
authority.48 
It is a balance between slowing the development process of the 
technology and establishing desirable quality parameters. Beyond doubt, ex 
ante regulatory strategies can be a great aid in enhancing overall efficiency, 
especially when involving a joint use of liability and regulation.49 
Nevertheless, in context of the progress of technology companies in recent 
years and investments all over the industry,50 it seems unlikely that the 
government will set appropriate guidelines and monitor compliance with 
them.51 Hence, there might be at present a serious information deficit on the 
part of public authorities. At this stage of the technology with its ability of 
improvement, it may be a gamble to set the socially desirable incentives ex 
ante. The E.U. prior conformity assessment procedure thus does not even 
seem close to a Pareto efficient opportunity; rather it could erect steep 
barriers to enter the AI market.52 When a country aims to maintain its 
leadership in AI, the author firmly believes that the applicable framework 
should not be excessively prescriptive, otherwise AI operators or developers 
face an incongruent burden. 
 
48 See id. at 23–24; The Council Regulation 2019/881, 2019 O.J. (L 151), 15–69 (The E.U. 
Cybersecurity Act) (containing an approach which could serve as a model). 
49 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, 15 
RAND J. ECON. 271, 275–278 (1984); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of 
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 365–71 (1984) (demonstrating that the joint use is generally 
socially advantageous); Massimo D’Antoni & Araham D. Tabbach, The Complementary Role 
of Liability and Safety Regulation, 21 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 150 (2019) (proposing a joint use 
of liability and regulation, which is based on a limitation of liability); DON DEWEES ET AL., 
EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 3–5 & 412–38 
(1996) (demonstrating a comprehensive empirical study of the effectiveness of the American 
tort system and the regulatory and compensatory alternatives to it). 
50 See supra Part I. 
51 See also Jackson, supra note 14, at 51 (arguing that it is questionable if the legislative 
process is able to keep up the pace with AI); Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black 
Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 930–931 (2018) 
(arguing that a system of regulation would ensure that only large companies can afford 
compliance with it and new entrants may not be able to do so); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. 
Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and The Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10–
16 (2017) (demonstrating the difficulties of an ex ante approach: “[f]or example, if there is a 
standard for the way a self-driving car brakes or avoids another car or avoids a person, what 
happens when the automaker pushes an update to the fleet? How can regulators be sure that 
the updated software complies with the standard?”). 
52 See generally Chester S. Spatt, Complexity of Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 1 
(2012). Also, U.S. courts have outlined that compliance costs may impede market entry, See, 
e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Co., 731 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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Finally, the prior conformity assessment is incomplete and civil liability 
has to be put in the loop. In particular, due to the unpredictability of the 
technology in connection with its extent of various potential and unknown 
victims, high-risk AI requires a clear allocation to liability rules. As is 
emphasized, if a large potential of harm is associated with the new 
technology a socially desirable liability system has the potential to 
meaningfully lower risks. The remainder of the contribution thus focuses on 
the governance of solely high-risk AI systems. It is assumed that the risk test 
is passed by an AI system. In this context, it is essential to analyze – as is 
done in Part III – whether and to what extent the current legal liability 
framework is already fit for the new technology. 
 
III. OPTIMAL LIABILITY REGIME FOR HIGH-RISK AI 
The primarily purpose of the liability system is to provide economic 
incentives for the liable party to prevent causing damages.53 Only where the 
cost of harm caused by AI is assigned to the actors engaging in such 
activities, a full cost reflection of the price of the activity in question can be 
achieved.54 Rational use of resources, encouragement of safety standards as 
well as discouragement of undesirable (risky) activities would be the result 
of such an AI liability framework. To be clear, hereinafter the aim is to 
determine such a scheme in relation to high-risk AI.55 Otherwise, the 
emergence of a dynamic AI industry throughout the U.S. landscape might be 
jeopardized. Consequently, first, it must be determined whether and, if so, 
difficulties in existing U.S. tort law doctrines occur (A.). Second, to justify 
new rules, it needs to be ascertained if the current U.S. framework or new 
E.U. initiatives are capable of providing socially desirable incentives (B.). 
 
A. LIMITATION OF U.S. TORT LAW DOCTRINES 
As technical advancements bring new challenges, it might be unclear 
how AI technology will be treated within the legal system. Legal doctrines 
 
53 Of course, the objective of liability law is not to avoid accidents at all costs arising from 
AI. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault 
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716–21 (1965); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence 
of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2012); See also 
U.S. Draft Mem., supra note 15, at 3–5. 
54 Gerhard Wagner, Robot Liability, at 3–4 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198764. 
55 See Part V (proposing a rule which achieves this objective). 
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are customized to human conduct, which may malfunction, when AI is 
used.56 In fact, it is necessary to assess whether the current liability doctrines 
can be applied properly to address the risks that emerge from AI or if 
adjustments are required within the current framework. 
 
i. Product Liability 
 
Product liability could seem a nearby tort law doctrine for AI devices.57 
In general, product liability balances the expected accident costs against the 
costs of making the product safer to determine a manufacturer’s liability, 
which is similar to the determination of negligence.58 Further, it is the core 
principle for manufacturer liability – no contractual relation is needed.59 
Three categories emerge as common grounds of product liability: 
manufacturing60, design61 and warning defects.62 
For product liability to be applicable, high-risk AI systems must fall 
within the scope of the doctrine. The subsumption of AI as product already 
poses crucial complications. In the case where software is embedded in 
hardware (e.g. robotics), product liability is applicable even if the defect only 
affects software.63 However, it is highly questionable whether AI falls under 
 
56 Bathaee, supra note 51, at 890–91. 
57 Already in 1996, the majority of the states adopted strict product liability, See David G. 
Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 743, 745 (1996); See also Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product 
Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2193, 2195–97 (1989); George L. Priest, The Invention 
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort 
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 505 (1985). See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product 
Liability, § 2 (b) (1998); See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965). 
58 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 57, at 747–51; Posner, supra note 31, at 210–12; only the 
product manufacturing defects are “truly ‘strict’”, see David G. Owen, Manufacturing 
Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 855 (2002). See Part III.A.3. (in terms of the negligence 
formula). 
59 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (2) (b) (1965). 
60 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2 (a) (1998). See generally Owen (2002), 
supra note 58, at 851–905. 
61 Id., at § 2(b). For an elaborate review see David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV. 
291 (2008). 
62 See generally Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169, 174 (S.C. 2010). 
63 See generally Thomas G. Wolpert, Product Liability and Software Implicated in Personal 
Injury, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 519 (1993). Courts have dealt with this kind of products in the past: 
See, e.g., the claim concerning an automated surgical system, Pohly v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 
No. 15-cv-04113-MEJ, 2017 WL 900760 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017); Reece v. Intuitive 
Surgical, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Ala. 2014). With regard to an alleged defective of 
an autopilot system in an aircraft see, e.g., Ferguson v. Bombardier Servs. Corp., 244 F. App’x 
944 (11th Cir. 2007). Further cases in Wagner, supra note 22, at 604. 
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the concept of a product when AI is not embedded in hardware (e.g. 
autonomous traffic management systems).64 Furthermore, the question 
arises: which economic operator shall be liable when several parties are 
involved? For example, defective digital elements may be implemented after 
a product has been placed on the market – some of which come separately 
from the tangible item.65 
Apart from basic issues, design defects are very significant in practice. 
Harm most likely to be caused by AI systems will be discussed under this 
category.66 The Third Restatement of Torts takes the position that “[a] 
product . . . is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller”67. The aspect of foreseeability 
might pose insoluble challenges in the respect of AI. Unpredictability is one 
of the key elements of AI which makes this technology so unique. To some 
extent, the core idea of AI is to act in an unforeseeable manner.68 Thus, it 
would be difficult to base any form of liability on foreseeable or expected 
risks of harm.69 Irrespective of foreseeability, a manufacturer may be 
justified in taking a known risk if the production’s benefit to society exceeds 
the overall harm.70 AI systems now pose a new challenge to the proper safety 
standard because they might be compared to a non-AI-based-product 
operated by a human being and vice versa. In cutting-edge AI cases, such a 
standard seems complex.71 
 
64 See the different approaches in DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1082 (3d ed. 
2015). 
65 E.g., a control app can be downloaded onto the user’s vehicle, cf. European Expert Grp. on 
Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 42–44. 
66 See Karni A. Chagal-Feferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product? When Products Liability 
Should Apply to Algorithmic Decision-Makers, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 80 (2019). 
67 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, § 2 (b) (1998). 
68 See supra Part II. 
69 Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability for Artificial-Intelligence-
Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1156–57 (2020); Jin Yoshikawa, Sharing the Costs 
of Artificial Intelligence: Universal No-Fault Social Insurance for Personal Injuries, 21 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1155, 1166–67 (2019).  
70 See Posner, supra note 31, at 210–12. 
71 See Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, 
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1611, 1644–47 
(2017); Wagner, supra note 22, at 605–06; See generally James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, 
Should “Relative Safety” be a Test of Product Liability?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1997). 
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In sum, the foregoing demonstrates a high degree of uncertainty 
regarding the application of product liability.72 
 
ii. Strict Liability 
 
Under a regime of strict liability, no design defects or negligence would 
be required to establish liability. Therefore, an injurer will be held liable for 
the harm that occurred, regardless of the level of care applied. “The liability 
arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity itself, and the risk that it 
creates, of harm to those in the vicinity.”73 U.S. courts insist two major 
criteria must be met before strict liability can be imposed: (i) the injurer’s 
activity generates a highly significant danger and (ii) is uncommon.74 
First, criterion (i) has to be applied upon high-risk AI, due to the fact that 
this replicates the distinctiveness between high-risk and non-high-risk AI.75 
However, the list of abnormally dangerous activities is short and has not been 
significantly expanded over the past years.76 Additionally, technologies such 
as AI will typically be implemented in goods of common usage, such as self-
driving cars or autonomous robots. All of those AI devices will be distributed 
innumerably throughout public space. Thus, the vast majority of losses might 
not be subsumed under the second criterion (ii). 
A brief glance at Europe reveals similar problems. Legislators within the 
E.U. member states often responded to risks induced by new technologies by 
introducing strict liability.77 Some jurisdictions,78 like Germany, are more 
restrictive whereas others, like France, have even established a general rule 
 
72 See also Jackson, supra note 14, at 58–59. But see David C. Vladeck, Machines without 
Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 150 (2014) 
(arguing that product liability doctrine could be applied on AI without any interruption as 
long as machines can be conceived as agents of a human being). 
73 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1) cmt. d (1977). 
74 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 20 (2010) (stating that 
these criteria are important in judicial decision-making as explained in cmts. e, g, h, j, and k). 
Although six factors ought to be weighed to conclude whether an activity is abnormally 
dangerous, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520 (1979). 
75 See supra Part II.A. 
76 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault 
in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 757–61 (2016). 
77 See the contributions to THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY IN RELATION TO TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2010). 
78 See UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (Bernhard A. Koch & Helmut Koziol 
eds., 2002) (noting that the landscape varies throughout the E.U. member states. However, 
attempts to harmonize strict liability have already been initiated). 
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of strict liability, which applies to dangerous activities.79 However, strict 
liability for the operations of AI or comparable is so far widely unknown 
throughout the European legislations.80 
In general, strict liability as well as product liability may not be 
applicable at all or may only cover a fraction of cases caused by AI systems. 




Unintended harms or accidents caused by someone ought to be 
compensated if the tortfeasor is blameworthy or at fault.81 In general, several 
elements are considered in assessing whether an act is negligent.82 One major 
aspect of negligence concerns the ascertainment of an appropriate standard 
of negligence, which seems even more challenging in terms of AI’s 
characteristics. 
In particular, a breach of duty based on a reasonable person is the 
standard to be applied.83 The operation of the law of negligence to determine 
that standard can be explained by the formula of Judge Learned Hand, who 
developed three elements of measurement.84 In short, these are: the 
magnitude of the specific loss, probability of the accident's occurring, and 
the burden of taking precautions that would prevent it.85 However, the 
 
79 See Art. 1242 of the Code civil (French Civil Code), which is not limited to any specific 
object or risk (explaining that the beneficial owner of a “thing” can be liable regardless of a 
defective); See generally Gerhard Wagner, Custodian’s Liability, in THE MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 441, 441–43 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2012). 
80 See European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 25–27; But 
see §§ 89e, 91b (8) of the Austrian Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz (Court Organization Act) 
(providing strict liability of the operator in terms of automated systems operated by the 
government).  
81 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29 (1972). 
82 Namely the existence of duty of care, a breach of the duty, harm caused to the victim, and 
a causal link between the breach and harm caused. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 657, 658 (2001). For Supreme Court decisions see David G. Owen, The Five Elements 
of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2007). 
83 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1979); see also Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262, 
1268 (7th Cir. 1989). 
84 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v. O'Brien, 
111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940). 
85 For further deliberations see John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 331–35 (1973); Posner (2014), supra note 31, at 191–96; Posner (1972), 
supra note 81, at 32–96. 
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standard specified by courts in practice is called ”due care” and might not 
always equal the optimal one since courts would need knowledge of all 
relevant facts.86 This issue appears even more critical in the area of AI 
because of its opaque black-box nature.87 Furthermore, it has been argued 
that courts intend to consider the risk resulting from a technology more than 
its advantages.88 As a result, these prospects may likely lead to a 
determination of unsatisfactory standards. 
Another necessity for establishing liability is a causal link between the 
victim’s harm and the tortfeasor’s sphere.89 New emerging technologies can 
raise sophisticated causation issues. Victims need to prove that their losses 
emerge from some conduct or risk attributable to the injurer.90 Subsequently, 
the required standard of proof has to be taken into consideration. In most 
civil law systems, judges need to be convinced of something equivalent to a 
degree of certainty91 in order to side with the party carrying the burden of 
proof.92 But also, within the U.S., as shown by cases like Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R. Co.,93 only purely logical or actual causation is insufficient to 
establish liability.94 Such an all-or-nothing dilemma is nothing unfamiliar to 
the legal system.95 When taking the interconnectedness and enlarged 
dependency on external input and data into account, AI adds complexity and 
therefore will become much more of an issue in the future. 
 
86 See Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
1717, 1740–42 (1982); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 997–99 (1984); ROBERT B. COOTER 
JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 217–20 (6th ed. 2016). 
87 See also Rachum-Twaig, supra note 69, at 1164; Yoshikawa, supra note 69, at 1167–68; 
Philipp Hacker et al., Explainable AI under contract and tort law: legal incentives and 
technical challenges, 28 AI & L. 415, 420–24 (2020) (noting that already the process of 
choosing a legitimate AI system for economic operators poses difficulties). 
88 See generally Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk 
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 320–29 (1985); See also Matthew U. 
Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competences, and 
Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 388 (2016). 
89 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 29 (2005). 
90 European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 20. 
91 At least a high degree of probability. 
92 European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 20. 
93 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
94 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 3 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 11:1; Giuffrida, supra note 
21, at 446. 
95 See PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Israel 
Gilead et al. eds., 2013) (explaining that in some circumstances a proportional liability might 
be a proper suggestion, accordingly the victim’s claim against each potential party is reduced 
to a quota corresponding to the chance of happening that each of them in fact caused the harm 
in question). 
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In summary, liability rules may work well for humans, but the 
applicability of tort law doctrines in the context of AI cannot be ascertained 
in a generalized way. Accordingly, legal uncertainty over the predictability 
of the outcome of litigation might be another aspect to be considered. Such 
a result may increase costs of legal dispute resolution and undermine the 
innovation of companies.96 
 
B. CHALLENGES OF SAFEGUARDING SOCIAL WELFARE 
The malfunctioning of tort doctrines emphasizes the need for 
adjustments in terms of the current liability rules. The deterrence goal 
provides the necessary normative orientation on how to structure liability 
rules for high-risk AI systems.97 If a liability framework for high-risk AI 
systems is designed from scratch, the effects of liability rules on parties’ 
behavior need to be analyzed. Once again, the objective should be to 
establish a liability rule that provides socially desirable incentives for the 
usage of AI. The following analysis takes a law and economics perspective. 
In October 2020, a Resolution was issued by the E.U. which included a 
draft bill.98 Art. 4 and Art. 10 of this approach establish strict liability with 
the defense of comparative negligence for high-risk AI systems throughout 
the entire E.U. landscape.99 Hereinafter, the E.U. proposal is compared with 
different liability rules in order to find the optimal solution for high-risk AI. 
Although the suggested approach of the new E.U. civil liability regime is 
flawed overall, it might be adoptable at least to some extent. Because a 
substantial risk of externalities occurs that conventional tort law is not 
designed to address. 
Consequently, the effects of liability rules on parties’ behavior are 
analyzed. Generally, it is presumed within this contribution that the social 
goal is broadly utilitarian in nature. Keeping it simple, two types of decisions 
 
96 See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974) (arguing that “[s]ince the costs of litigating 
are generally higher than the costs of settling a dispute out of court, an increase in the 
settlement rate (at least within a broad range) should reduce the total costs of legal dispute 
resolution. Greater certainty as to outcome might have an indirect effect on the settlement rate 
as well as the direct effect just discussed.”). For empirical investigation on the effects of less 
uncertainty and innovation, see note 162. 
97 See supra Part III. 
98 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3; See also E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 13–16. 
99 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4–7. 
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by the parties involved in an accident100 are examined. On the one hand, the 
level of care when engaging in an activity. On the other hand, the level of 
activity. Especially, in terms of new technologies, both the level of care and 
activity shall be considered.101 For the achievement of social welfare, both 
parties involved in an accident should take appropriate care by increasing 
safety up to the point at which a further increase of a dollar would no longer 
reduce the accident costs by a dollar. Further, they should also engage in 
their activity at a level that properly balances the utility they obtain against 
the extra risks they thereby create.102 Note also that it is necessary that each 
party considers the full amount of an accident in order to choose socially 
desirable safety and activity levels. 
 
i. Losses caused by AI under U.S. Tort Law Doctrines 
 
First, taking the observed difficulties of the U.S. major liability rules into 
account,103 it does not appear farfetched to not apply any liability rule on 
specific AI based accidents. Hence, the following question must be raised: is 
it socially desirable that “losses lie where they fall.”104 
(i) Under no liability, however, injurers would fail to take care. 
Additionally, they would engage in their activity as long as they obtain any 
additional utility because they would not face any liability.105 Overall, the 
level of safety would be systematically low from a social perspective, and 
the activity level would be excessive since AI operators solely compensate 
their own losses.106 Therefore, it could be considered that the U.S. policy of 
being hesitant to legislate AI has a detrimental effect for society.107 The 
legislative aim might thus be the rejection of abstract principles and 
introduction of explicit assignment of liability rules regarding AI systems. 
A straightforward way to achieve this seems to be the adjustment of 
current negligence, product liability or strict liability laws. But even so, if 
 
100 By the wording “accident”, a harmful outcome which none of the parties involved wished 
to occur is meant. 
101 Hereinafter, it is assumed that tortfeasor, as well as victim, can take care and choose the 
level of activity and thereby lower accident risks – so-called bilateral accidents, see generally 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182–93 & 199–206 (2004). 
102 See also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–6 (1987). 
103 See supra Part III.A. 
104 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 47 (1881, republished 2009). 
105 Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 11 & 22–23. 
106 Cf. Steven Shavell, On the Redesign of Accident Liability for the World of Autonomous 
Vehicles, 49 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 254–55 (2020). 
107 See White House, supra note 12; U.S. Draft Mem., supra note 15. 
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these tort law doctrines can be frictionless applied, none of them lead to a 
socially desirable solution. This is illustrated by the following: 
(ii) Under strict liability (ignoring for the moment the defense of 
comparative or contributory negligence),108 one must bear in mind that such 
AI devices can also cause damage to each other, giving rise to a situation 
comparable to no liability.109 The parties are reciprocally liable to each other 
for the same amount of losses. In this scenario, both are not better or worse 
off if there was simply no liability.110 
(iii) Under negligence,111 the primary issue is that courts have to specify 
the level of care based on the Learned Hand formula – so-called due care.112 
If the injurers apply at least due care, they would not be held liable.113 
Generally, the ability of courts to select the socially optimal level of care 
might be already difficult. AI is no different, its opacity might actually 
increase the complexity.114 However, even if it is assumed that due care 
chosen by courts equals the optimal level of care, the activity level of the 
injurer would not be controlled. Because courts would need to ascertain the 
character of the benefits parties derive from their activities, this seems 
practically impossible.115 An excessive level of activity would be the result. 
 
108 See, e.g., Adam Rosenberg, Strict Liability: Imagining a Legal Framework for 
Autonomous Vehicles, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 205, 218–23 (2017) (arguing the 
implementation of strict liability without considering comparative or contributory 
negligence). 
109 See Part III.B.3. 
110 See generally Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 117 
(1974); Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case 
of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 76–78 (1990). 
111 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort 
Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018) (emphasizing that negligence should be preferred 
over strict liability). 
112 See supra Part III.A.3. 
113 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
63–64 (1987). 
114 See supra Part III.A.3 (noting the difficulties due to the information asymmetry among 
courts). See Mousa Alshanteer, A Current Regime of Uncertainty: Improving Assessments of 
Liability for Damages Caused by Artificial Intelligence, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 27, 37–55 
(2020) (noting difficulties in the field of AI and health care). 
115 Steven Shavell, Strict liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–7 (1980); See also 
Landes & Posner, supra note 113, at 66–67; Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 25–26 (noting 
that in general, negligence is only defined as care alone, without activity. This ‘defect’ might 
be justified by the reason that the optimal and actual activity level would be difficult for courts 
to choose due to the lack of information). 
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(iv) Under product liability of the manufacturer to third-parties,116 the 
manufacturer of the AI system may be held liable if it caused harm to third-
parties.117 Now, difficulties occur by determining the level of production 
under negligence rule because courts would have to balance production costs 
against consumer assessment.118 Courts might be likely to choose the 
standard of care insufficient or excessive. Beyond a doubt, the finding of 
liability for victims under product liability is complicated due to the diverse 
doctrinal considerations.119 Under product liability of the manufacturer to 
buyers, in contrast to before, the buyer of the AI system is the compensated 
party by the manufacturer. Now, buyers would wish to buy AI systems with 
a safety level that they find best and ignore liability rules. Therefore, buyers 
would only consider their own loss. AI manufacturers would have no reason 
to obey the safety requirements and the activity level would be socially 
excessive.120 
It is important to note that a clear allocation of liability rules to high-risk 
AI systems seems necessary to increase its benefits for society. Further, not 
one conventional doctrine above is able to provide a balanced solution. Of 
course, these findings are not new.121 But certainly, the unique characteristic 
of AI system might enhance the issues indicated above. For example, the 
difficulties for courts to select the socially optimal level of care. So, the E.U. 
seeks to take such aspects into account by the establishment of a new draft 
bill for AI. 
 
 
116 See, e.g., Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 66, at 61–114 (arguing that when harm is caused 
by AI it shall be subject to conventional product liability rules). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010) 
(questioning the benefit challenges of product liability in general); But see John C.P. Goldberg 
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to 
Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010); A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, A Skeptical Attitude About Product Liability Is Justified: A Reply to 
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (2010). 
117 See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 1969, 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 
84 (where a car collided head-on with the victim); see generally Keeton et al., supra note 82, 
at § 100. The type of liability rule applied depends on the category of defect, see supra Part 
III.A.1. In principle, the levels of safety and activity might be analogue to those of negligence 
or strict liability. 
118 The aspect that manufacturers (firms) harm third-parties is illustrated by A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. ASSOC. 363 
(1980); Shavell (2004), supra note 101, at 207–12. 
119 See Keeton et al., supra note 82, at §§ 93, 95–98; See also supra Part III.A.1. 
120 Cf. Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 263–64. 
121 See generally Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 11, 29 (demonstrating that none of the 
existing liability rules are leading to optimal levels of activities). 
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ii. Losses caused by AI under the E.U. proposal 
 
With its draft bill, the European Union is trying to strike a balance 
between efficiently and fairly protecting potential victims of harm or damage 
while providing enough leeway for enterprises to develop new technologies, 
products or services.122 This objective can be achieved by using the 
technology only when it is beneficial to society. Hence, the total amount of 
social losses by an activity needs to be internalized by the parties involved. 
Regardless the field of AI’s application (e.g. finance, automotive or health 
care), the E.U. pursues the introduction of strict liability with the defense of 
comparative negligence according to Art. 4 and Art. 10 of the draft bill. 
In an effort to illustrate the impacts of the E.U. proposal, it is applied on 
the basis of an initial model.123 The analysis will be based on a simple 
example: A is the operator124 of a high-risk AI system; during its application 
stranger B gets harmed and suffers a $25,000 loss, whereas A suffers no 
harm. The total social costs of the accident are $25,000. 
(v) Under strict liability with the defense of comparative negligence, 
optimum social behavior of AI operators would be achieved, but the activity 
level of potential victims would remain unchanged. Still, the E.U. approach 
seems to be the most desirable one in comparison to other possibilities 
mentioned before. 
This is illustrated by the following: the E.U. proposal would lead to the 
result that injurers125 pay for all accident losses ($25,000) that they cause 
because they are strictly liable.126 They would enjoy the benefits of engaging 
in the activity and defray the costs of care. The activity would only be 
engaged in if the extra utility injurers derive from it exceeds theirs costs of 
care as well as their expected liability payments for accidents.127 
 
122 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at (B). 
123 This following will rely on two assumptions. First, an increase in injurers’ activity level 
will result in a proportionate increase in expected accident losses, given their level of care. 
Second, increasing the activity will result in an increase in their utility. See Shavell (1987), 
supra note 102, at 6–7 & 21–22. 
124 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 3 (d), (e) & (f) (providing a definition for possible 
operators involved). 
125 For reasons of simplifications, unless explicitly noted otherwise it will not be distinguished 
between manufacturer’s or operator’s liability. The presented conclusion applies to both, 
because it is assumed that the manufacturer is capable of passing the costs on the buyer 
(operator). See generally Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency 
and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991). 
126 See supra Part III.A.2. 
127 See Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 23; Posner, supra note 31, at 205–07. 
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Consequently, strict liability ensures that the objective of the high-risk AI 
operator is the same as the social objective one.128 A would bear the total 
amount of harm ($25,000) – achieving cost internalization. Additionally, 
comparative negligence affects the victim’s compensation on account of her 
or his unreasonable conduct.129 Under Art. 10 of the E.U. declaration the AI 
operator’s extent of liability shall be reduced in accordance with the fault of 
the victim and shall not be liable if the victim is solely or predominantly 
accountable.130 Ideally victims are thus forced to choose due care131 as they 
would not bear any of their accident losses; instead, injurers would be 
liable.132 But victims would engage in their activity whenever their utility 
exceeded the cost of taking due care.133 The E.U. proposal is not able to affect 
the activity level of potential victims. B may engage in her or his activity 
excessively. How significant this deficiency really is cannot be explained in 
a generalized way. The severity of this defect depends on the expected 
magnitude of the losses caused by an activity. If the activity by its nature 
creates substantial risks, it would be desirable to control the risk – as it is 
done with the activity level of the high-risk AI operator. The activity level 
of victims might not be a crucial factor, especially when they participate in 
activities of ordinary life (like walking).134 
Considering that A is the operator of a self-driving car and B is a 
pedestrian, the activity level of B might not be significant. In this case, B’s 
optimum level of care might already be sufficient. 
In sum, it seems certainly conceivable that the introduced E.U. 
legislative framework can direct a desirable solution for AI. Such an 
approach, however, needs to be flexible enough to provide optimal 
incentives when high-risk AI systems cause damage to each other. 
 
128 See Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 23. 
129 In some circumstances the victim may only recover a portion of the suffered loss. 
Comparative negligence originates from contributory negligence which features an all-or-
nothing rule. See generally A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, Study of Comparative 
Negligence, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 333 (1932); Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative 
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978). In an ideal complete-information world 
the effects on the care level vanish between comparative and contributory negligence, see, 
e.g., Posner, supra note 31, at 200–04; for a precise analysis between the economic differences 
see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 433 (2003). 
130 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 10 (referring to “contributory negligence”, however 
it corresponds to the U.S. terminology of comparative negligence). 
131 However, difficulties occur when evidentiary uncertainty and court error are added, see 
Parts III.A.3 & III.B.3. 
132 Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 13. 
133 See id. at 27–28. 
134 See id. at 29. 
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iii. Losses caused by AI vs. AI under the E.U. proposal 
 
So far, the E.U. proposal seems to direct high-risk AI in the best suitable 
way. A single AI operator would only engage in an activity if it was socially 
desirable and the proper level of care by potential victims was potentially 
adequate. Nevertheless, all that glitters is not gold. A counter-intuitive result 
will be exemplified hereinafter. The European approach is insufficient due 
to its lack of flexibility. A pressing problem looming on the horizon was not 
considered by the E.U.: reciprocal accidents of two or more high-risk AI 
operators. 
The E.U. neglects to consider the impact of the new liability rules for the 
long-term. In order to be effective and useful, a framework needs to reflect 
the aspect that high-risk based AI systems cause harm to each other. First, 
several self-driving cars can cause a collision.135 Second, autonomous 
unmanned aircrafts (drones) may crash.136 Third, autonomous robots are able 
to cause damage to each other and so on. Scenarios like these do not seem 
unrealistic at all and deserve attention before they become part of society on 
a daily basis. 
In reference to our initial example above, the differences are now that 
harm is suffered by each party involved and both parties are high-risk AI 
operators. A and B each suffer a $25,000 loss. Both cause and suffer losses. 
The total social costs of the accident are now $50,000.137 It is crucial to 
recognize that a desirable liability rule must oblige each party to incur the 
total social costs of expenses from an accident ($50,000). The proper 
incentives for the safety and activity level would be accomplished only if A 
has to bear $50,000 (the total social costs). The same applies to B. 
(v) Under strict liability with the defense of comparative negligence, 
socially optimal care levels of AI operators would be achieved only if courts 
are able to calculate optimal care. Otherwise, a scenario similar to no liability 
 
135 See Paul Lienert, Two rival self-driving cars have close call in California, REUTERS TECH. 
NEWS, (June 26, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-nearmiss/two-
rival-self-driving-cars-have-close-call-in-california-idUSKBN0P601T20150626. 
136 See, e.g., Dhiraj Gandhi et al., Drone Uses AI and 11,500 Crashes to Learn How to Fly, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (May 10, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/drones/drone-
uses-ai-and-11500-crashes-to-learn-how-to-fly (teaching a drone how to fly autonomously by 
crashing into objects). 
137 This example, in a simplified form, is based on Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 250–53 
(demonstrating the issue described on autonomous vehicles, which are subsumed as high-risk 
AI in accordance with the E.U. proposal). Additionally, the findings in terms of the formal 
analysis apply also to the following, id. at 264–76. 
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might be the outcome. Moreover, comparative negligence might add further 
complexity to determine the optimum care standard. Despite the negligence 
standard, a suboptimal activity level would remain unchanged. Overall, the 
E.U. proposal does not induce socially desirable incentives for AI operators. 
This is illustrated by the following: A and B face strict liability. 
Consequently, each of them would compensate the other party with the loss 
of $25,000. A as well as B would, in fact, bear half of the social costs of an 
accident.138 The result is symmetrical to the situation of no liability.139 To 
create efficient liability rules, the E.U. proposal considers the aspect of 
comparative negligence to be applied along with strict liability.140 The injurer 
is held liable for harm only if the victim did not act negligently, that is, when 
the victim’s level of care was at least her or his level of due care.141 If A 
chooses a safety level considering the loss of $25,000, he or she would be 
deemed negligent by courts, because A’s level of care is below the total costs 
of $50,000 (due care equals optimal care). As a result, A has to recover B for 
the harm caused of $25,000 (because of strict liability) as well as compensate 
– at least part of – her or his suffered loss of $25,000 (because of comparative 
negligence) and vice versa applies to B. Hence, in order to escape 
comparative negligence both A and B would choose due care,142 which 
equals the total costs of $50,000; otherwise, they would have to additionally 
bear their own losses. 
Several problematic aspects within this regime occur: 
First, courts need to define due care according to the total social costs of 
an accident – in our case $50,000, which seems challenging. This might 
misguide tort law related to AI; the result of an inappropriate level of care 
could impede important AI developments.143 With a new and complex 
technology like AI and its back-box problem, it is implausible that courts are 
 
138 Cf. Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 255–56. 
139 See supra Part III.B.1. 
140 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4 & Art. 10. 
141 See Shavell (2004), supra note 101, at 145. 
142 Under perfect information comparative negligence creates efficient incentives for the level 
of care, see, e.g., Mireia Artigot i Golobardes & Fernando Gómez Pomar, Contributory and 
comparative negligence in the law and economics literature, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 
46, 53–59 (Michael Faure ed., 2009). 
143 See supra Part I. See generally George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: 
Its Sources, Its Effects and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31, 42–49 (1991). 
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able to formulate desirable standards.144 Parties may be led to take either poor 
or unnecessarily high care in terms of the court’s information deficit.145 
Second, comparative negligence is very costly to administer.146 And 
having to face another challenge: the allocation of joint costs for courts; 
comparative negligence adds thus further uncertainty.147 
Third, if the parties chose their care levels in accordance with the 
negligence standard, the level of activity would still be prohibitively high. 
Because each only bears half of the social costs – in our case $25,000. Parties 
make and receive damage payments due to the aspect of strict liability. Thus, 
if both parties chose due care, A would have to compensate B for her or his 
losses of $25,000 and B would have to compensate A for her or his losses of 
$25,000. The important point to stress is that high-risk AI systems would be 
used excessively. Full cost ($50,000) internalization by the parties cannot be 
achieved. 
It is clear that the more often high-risk AI systems are used, the more 
losses will materialize. Different to the aspect when only one high-risk AI 
operator is strictly liable, now the activity level of both AI deployers does 
not represent the total social costs ($50,000). This insufficient outcome of 
the E.U. proposal gets even worse when it comes to activities of companies. 
In the foreseeable future, companies will retain the majority of AI users.148 
In order to compete on the market, goods have to be offered at the lowest 
possible price. If the price does not represent the full social costs, the demand 
will be too high and result in a misallocation.149 These issues might result in 
serious consequences for the ongoing distribution of high-risk AI. 
In conclusion, none of the conventional liability rules would perform 
well to regulate the risks emerging from AI. Worse yet, the new E.U. 
initiative does not provide a proper solution either. These observations 
conclude that the U.S. and E.U. forego important opportunities to reduce the 
 
144 See supra Part III.A.3. 
145 Courts may also wrongly assess the level of care actually taken, see generally John E. 
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). 
146 E.g. there are more claims and therefore more lawsuits in comparison to contributory 
negligence, see Stuart Low & Janet Kiholm Smith, Decisions to Retain Attorneys and File 
Lawsuits: An Examination of the Comparative Negligence Rule in Accident Law, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 535 (1995). 
147 When evidentiary uncertainty and court error are introduced it cannot be generally 
concluded that comparative negligence is a superior negligence rule, see Bar-Gill & Ben-
Shahar, supra note 129, at 463-64; Cf. Posner, supra note 31, at 201. 
148 See citations supra note 37. 
149 See Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 47–72. 
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risks and enhance desirable development of AI on account of their liability 
framework or new proposals. 
 
iv. Shielding businesses to accelerate one’s leadership? 
 
Shielding businesses from liability for the harm caused does not imply 
that the leadership of one’s country is strengthened. Once again, it is 
necessary to ensure that the price of an activity represents its total costs. This 
can only be achieved if the costs of harm caused by dangerous activities are 
beard by the actor conducting such activities – so-called cost 
internalization.150 On the contrary, where all or parts of the risk continue to 
be externalized, individuals would engage excessively in such an activity 
because the costs are too low for the activity.151 In general, it is inefficient to 
encourage harmful activities, because this would lead to an oversupply 
thereof.152 New technologies like AI do not need a special treatment, at least 
not in terms of the liability regime, as they will pay their way into society.153 
 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE E.U. 
The foregoing elaboration points irresistibly to four lessons which can 
be learned from the European attempt to build an AI framework. 
First, the European proposed enumerative sectoral approach of high-risk 
AI should not be pursued.154 In many cases an AI system might even affect 
several sectors and cannot be allocated to one.155 Indeed, it rather shall be 
focused on a concrete framework related to the degree of risk. Overall, the 
risk-based approach might be an adequate criterion to ensure the general 
levels of safety and strengthen the competitiveness of companies. However, 
it has been argued that courts tend to be too cautious of new risks because 
these are less familiar hazards, and more common ones are not as much of a 
danger.156 This issue can only be mitigated by a precise characterization of 
high-risk AI, so that non-high-risk AI systems do not face an incongruent 
 
150 See Shavell (2004), supra note 101, at 193–97. 
151 See id. at 193–97. 
152 See id. at 208–212. 
153 See Wagner, supra note 54, at 3. 
154 See supra Part II.A. 
155 See also Philipp Hacker, AI Regulation in Europe, at 9–10 (2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3556532. 
156 See, e.g., Huber, supra note 88, at 319. 
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burden.157 Still, a more in-depth and detailed assessment of the qualification 
of ‘high-risk’ is necessary to overcome the mentioned difficulties. It seems 
that a probability/magnitude test focusing on the riskiness could cure several 
difficulties of the E.U. attempt. The impacts of an event will be taken in 
relation to its probability of occurrence and the more serious the impact of 
the event, the lower its probability of occurrence may be. 
The focus on the specific risk of harm can already be located in new 
developing areas such as cybersecurity in the U.S.158 If such exemplified first 
steps will be continued, an increase of social welfare and a boost of people’s 
trust in the usage of AI can be the consequence. 
Second, the European declaration of certifying high-risk AI before 
placing it on the market might only result in high administrative costs and 
should not be pursued.159 Given that the technological potentials of AI are 
currently hardly foreseeable, an ex-ante hurdle to enter the market does not 
seem desirable. If unprecedented questions exist and regulators may not have 
sufficient information in the early stage of AI technology, it cannot 
meaningfully be regulated ex ante. Therefore, the obligation that AI 
developers require a certificate to distribute their technology may harm a 
company’s ability to innovate and to gain. 
Overall, banning uncertified high-risk AI systems from the market 
without any possibility of foregoing certification seems burdensome, 
especially due to the challenging aspects of distinguishing between high-risk 
and non-high-risk AI. Socially desirable approaches to the high-risk sector 
should thus be based on tort law. 
Third, in light of the myriad of challenges mentioned above and due to 
the limitations of existing regimes, an adjusted liability framework for AI 
seems to be the only viable path. Because applying existing tort law doctrines 
may leave losses undesirable under or even uncompensated. As long as the 
question of the application of U.S. liability rules is entirely unresolved and 
 
157 See Christiane Wendehorst, Strict Liability for AI and other Emerging Technologies, 11 J. 
EUR. TORT L. 150, 165–66 (2020) (providing a risk matrix for different categories of risks 
concerning AI). 
158 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, 1–21 (Apr. 16, 2018) (“[t]he Framework is adaptive to 
provide a flexible and risk-based implementation that can be used with a broad array of 
cybersecurity risk management processes.”); see also Paul Schwartz, Risk and high risk: 
Walking the GDPR tightrope, (Mar. 29, 2016) (distinguishing between two types of risks in 
terms of the European GDPR), https://iapp.org/news/a/risk-and-high-risk-walking-the-gdpr-
tightrope/. 
159 See supra Part II.B. 
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therefore unpredictable,160 tort law potentially has a chilling effect.161 
Empirical data has already demonstrated that if legal certainty is provided to 
economic operators it can result in higher innovation investments by 
mitigating the factor of uncertainty over the litigation trial.162 
Nonetheless, the new European approach requires also further 
amendments. While the E.U. proposal of strict liability with the defense of 
comparative negligence might at least result in a desirable outcome if a 
single high-risk AI operator is involved.163 However, the contrary has been 
achieved when two high-risk AI operators are reciprocally liable to each 
other.164 Efficiency and trust throughout society cannot be accomplished. In 
general, the E.U.’s one-size-fits all concept shall not be pursued and rather 
serves as primary guideline. 
Ultimately, the fourth lesson of the European proposal is to adopt strict 
liability with the defense of comparative negligence. But the rule ought to be 
applied solely related to events of damages where only one high-risk AI 
operator is involved. Thus, a further subdivision between, on the one hand, 
accidents of only one high-risk-based AI system involved and,165 on the other 
hand, accidents involving at least two high-risk based systems166 could close 
the gap within the liability regime. A separate liability rule for the latter 
needs to be considered – as is done in Part V. 
 
V. FILLING THE GAPS IN LIABILITY LAW: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL 
A. SOLUTION: STRICT LIABILITY TO THE STATE 
Throughout the different categories of liability regimes none of them 
seems capable of ensuring a social welfare optimum.167 Having explained 
why current rules cover AI socially undesirable, the aspect of parties 
compensating each other is the crucial one. Now, based on the deliberations 
 
160 See supra Part III.A. 
161 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
285, 303–08 (2008). 
162 See Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, When does Product Liability Risk Chill Innovation? 
Evidence from Medical Implants, at 42 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3207503; See also 
Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation, 
41 RAND J. ECON. 472 (2010). 
163 See supra Part III.B.2. 
164 See supra Part III.B.3. 
165 See supra Part III.B.2. 
166 See supra Part III.B.3. 
167 See supra Part III.B. 
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of Professor Steven Shavell,168 this contribution proposes strict liability with 
losses paid to the state,169 not only in the case of autonomous vehicles, but 
rather for all cases of loss involving at least two high-risk AI systems.170 This 
liability rule serves as an opportunity to close the gaps of the E.U. initiatives. 
Under the proposed rule, AI operators will be strictly liable where payments 
of harm caused are made to the state instead of compensating the other party. 
The characteristic of AI enables its enforcement. 
Although, reinventing the proverbial wheel for each new technology 
does not seem to be an adequate solution,171 the alternative of applying 
current liability frameworks to new technologies are more likely to lead to 
socially undesirable results.172 In light of this, the objective of this 
contribution is to propose how regulators can fix the old wheel to 
accommodate for advancements in technology. 
Most importantly, the core problem of a strict liability regime is that it is 
not possible to accomplish liability payments of the parties that reflect the 
total amount of social losses.173 Further, the duty of courts to formulate 
optimal level of care might not result in desirable incentives for society.174 
The following discussion proposes a liability framework where parties make 
payments to the state and is capable of closing these gaps. 
Under a strict liability to the state scheme, parties would be held strictly 
liable for the harm they cause, but payments are made to the state, and not to 
the injured party. This structure achieves the socially desirable level of safety 
and activity.175 First, none of the high-risk AI operators involved would be 
reimbursed for their injuries and each would bear total cost of the harm 
caused. Additionally, social optimal incentives are achieved. 
 
168 Shavell (2020), supra note 106 (suggesting strict liability to the state in the context of 
autonomous vehicles); Jerry Green, On the optimal structure of liability laws, 7 BELL J. ECON. 
553, 553–54 (1976); Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 29–30. 
169 The final designation of “strict liability to the state” is still open to discussion, as it is rather 
akin to an administrative penalty than to a liability rule.  
170 See supra Part II.A (in terms of the segregation of high-risk and non-high-risk AI). 
171 See Lyria B. Moses, How to Think About Law, Regulation and Technology: Problems with 
‘Technology’ as a Regulatory Target, 5 L. INNOV. & TECH. 1, 19 (2013). 
172 But see Ignacio N. Cofone, Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 167, 189–91 & 197 (2018) (arguing that analogies are the best method to deal 
with new technologies. However, despite the optimism surrounding such analogies, the 
aforementioned (Part III.B.) wrong incentives will still be enhanced). 
173 See supra Part III.B. 
174 See supra Parts II.A.3. & III.B.1. 
175 See supra note 125 (the liability of the manufacturer as well as the operator will lead to a 
desirable result because the manufacturer will pass on the costs to the operator). 
Summer 2021 TOWARDS OPTIMAL LIABILITY FOR AI 219 
 
   
 
Using the previous example, A and B are causing damage of $25,000 to 
each other,176 the framework’s objective is that each party bears the total 
social costs of an accident – in our case $50,000. For example, under the 
strictly liability to the state scheme, A has to pay $25,000 to the state for the 
losses of B as well as compensate her or his own loss of $25,000. The same 
distribution of losses applies to B. Both A and B each pay the total social 
costs of $50,000. As a result, parties would undertake the socially desirable 
decisions to increase their safety level. Additionally, the resulting level of 
activity would be socially desirable. Since both parties’ own losses equal the 
social losses ($ 50,000), the parties would consequently choose a socially 
correct decision in terms of the activity level to avoid the costs. Thus, the 
outcome faced under strict liability to the state would be optimal.177 
At first glance, one could suggest that if A and B are each paying the 
social costs ($50,000) they cannot act socially desirable because they have 
to pay twice the social harm. Together A and B are paying $50,000 to the 
state and covering $50,000 for their own losses (in total $100,000), which 
would lead to excessive safety as well as overly cautious activity. This 
intuition would only be correct if the parties involved made their decisions 
cooperatively. But within this model it is assumed that A and B are strangers 
to each other and select their safety and activity level independently – as it 
might be the case in practice with regard to high-risk AI systems. No 
contractual relations are possible before an accident happens. 
Most notably, the economic operators will be induced to make 
appropriate decisions. For instance, operators will invest in training AI on 
data sets that are sufficiently broad to avoid dangerous situations, and keep 
robust and accurate records and data.178 The parties in charge will then, out 
of their financial self-interest, achieve the socially desirable standards for 
society. Furthermore, because AI systems will be used primarily by 
companies in the foreseeable future, adequate incentives related to the level 
of activity are of the utmost importance to achieve a desirable outcome for 
society.179 
Critics of strict liability argue that it may impose barriers to market entry 
for AI companies.180 However, by deploying strict liability to high-risk AI, 
 
176 See supra Parts III.B.2. & III.B.3. 
177 Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 256–58, 260-61. 
178 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 18–21 (where these criteria are mentioned). 
179 See supra Part III.B.3. 
180 Bathaee, supra note 51, at 931–32 (“Finally, strict liability may impose significant barriers 
to entry. It may simply be too costly, unpredictable, or difficult to produce and deploy AI 
without risking potentially ruinous liability. The possibility of unpredictable liability would 
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it is possible to remove these barriers to market entry. First, one core aspect 
of strict liability is to cover hazardous activities; thus, the unpredictable 
manner of AI is predestined for strict liability in the way that economic 
operators internalize the associated costs of their activity. 181 Second, if the 
associated costs exceed the benefits of the activity, the harmful activity will 
not be undergone.182 Now, unlike the discussed certification process 
above,183 the ex-ante decision maker in charge is the informed economic AI 
operator. It is up to each individual to calculate the costs and benefits of an 
activity and finally decide whether or not to undertake it. Further, the 
aforementioned critical task by courts to assess a socially optimal level of 
care will be assigned to the economic operators,184 who (again) are better 
informed about the associated risks and benefits of their activity.185 Judges 
are in charge to ascertain the harm caused and to allocate it to the responsible 
parties, which seems efficient, because they are more experienced than other 
institutions.186 
Further, the aspect that new technologies innovate too quickly for the 
liability framework because of the eagerness of judges to punish these for 
breaking from the status quo cannot be argued in relation to this proposal.187 
Once again, strict liability to the state does not require courts to formulate 
any level of care. Further, the aforementioned approach emerges as an 
opportunity to achieve the objectives of the U.S. leadership program on 
AI.188 The incentives to reduce risks do not dilute because the parties 
involved have to bear the total harm caused in an accident – cost 
internalization is achieved. 
 
 
therefore, like a byzantine regulatory structure, provide significant barriers to entry in most 
markets where there are already large players”). 
181 See Shavell (2018), supra note 46 (arguing that a dangerous activity should be the only 
aspect to impose strict liability). 
182 See supra note 37 (because mainly companies are the developers of AI, which are aiming 
to maximize their net surplus). 
183 See supra Part II.B. 
184 See supra Parts III.A.3. & III.B.1. 
185 Cf. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Frank Müller-Langer, Strict Liability versus Negligence, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. AND ECON.: TORT L. AND ECON. 3, 11 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
186 Scherer, supra note 88, at 388–89. 
187 George L. Priest, The Effects of Modern Tort Law on Innovation and Economic Growth, 
in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 
273, 273 (Kaufmann Foundation ed., 2011) (tort liability “has operated as a tax . . . without 
commensurate benefit to consumers. The effect of expanded tort liability has been to suppress 
innovation and reduce U.S. economic growth”); Huber, supra note 88, at 278. 
188 White House, supra note 12; See U.S. Draft Mem., supra note 15. 
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B. SELECTED APPLICATION CHALLENGES 
Finally, the exemplified solution poses various emerging questions. 
Within this contribution four basic issues shall be dealt with. Indubitably, 
this listing is not exhaustive.189 
 
i. Scheme of liability without compensation? 
 
The element of furnishing compensation to accident victims is missing 
at the regime of strict liability to the state– as it is not necessary. Indeed, this 
seems unfamiliar related to liability law. But in order to set the desirable 
incentives to reduce risk, not even one of the operators involved needs to be 
compensated. On the contrary, the compensation of both parties, as shown 
above, would result in an inadequate standard. The broad distribution of first-
party insurance in industrialized economies establishes a less costly 
mechanism for compensation than the tort system does by itself. 
Accordingly, the adoption of liability is not necessary regarding the 
compensation of an injured party.190 
 
ii. Excessive administrative costs? 
 
Before implementing strict liability with damages paid to the state the 
costs of administering the treatment of accidents must be taken into 
consideration.191 The most pressing problem might be the associated costs 
caused by the judicial procedure after losses have occurred. Proving the 
obligatory facts of tort law doctrines requires analytical capacity and 
technical expertise, which might be prohibitively costly, especially for 
victims of AI systems. In general, an analysis of U.S. tort litigation costs has 
already demonstrated that the administrative costs are estimated to be 53% 
to 54% of net injured party’s benefits.192 Hence, redistributing one dollar 
from the tortfeasor to the plaintiff finally represents 53 to 54 cents. 
In contrast to other liability regimes, strict liability to the state does not 
require knowledge of the standard of care or the level of care actually taken. 
It seems relatively easy to administer compared to conventional liability 
 
189 For example, further analysis with regard to insurance, competent authority or the extent 
of compensation seems necessary. 
190 See Wagner, supra note 54, at 3; Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 279; See generally 
TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (Gerhard Wagner ed., 2005). 
191 Calabresi (1970), supra note 53, at 28 (so-called tertiary costs). 
192 James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation, 
RAND REP. NO. R-3391-ICJ, at 68–71 (1986); See also Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost 
Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073 (2002). 
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rules.193 But the determination of the responsible party as well as the amount 
of harm caused may still increase the associated costs. Of course, these final 
impacts are empirical questions and cannot be examined within this 
contribution. A possible approach to circumvent this issue might be the 
establishment of a blanket fee depending on which high-risk AI system 
caused the damage. Different high-risk AI Systems would be categorized, 
and payment would depend thereon. Moreover, such a suggestion is not 
uncommon because insurance companies cannot know an individual insurer 
in advance, they must predict certain classes of policyholders. Hence, an 
insurer already sorts the same risks and so calculates the insurance premiums 
ex ante, which ought to internalize the full amount of associated costs of an 
accident.194 
 
iii. Scope of application by scenarios of mixed liability? 
 
When mixed liability regimes are employed, the ideal incentives are 
going to dilute. Reinforcing the view that a distinction among accidents is 
paramount. Namely between accidents of (i) a single high-risk AI system 
and other operators (e.g. humans or other objects) on the one hand, and (ii) 
solely high-risk AI systems on the other hand. Assuming in light of the initial 
example195 that the high-risk AI operator is held strictly liable to the state, 
whereas the counterpart is held strictly liable with payments to the other 
party. Now, the AI operator would have to bear only half of the total harm, 
because he or she pays $25,000 to the state but at the same time he or she is 
also compensated by the other one. The outcome is inefficient due to the fact 
that high-risk AI systems will be compensated. 
Additionally, if the injurer uses a high-risk AI system that suffers little 
or no harm, and the victim suffers almost all of the harm, strict liability with 
a defense of comparative negligence will likely be able to achieve a socially 
desirable risk reduction – as analyzed above.196 In terms of at least two high-
risk AI systems involved, the gap between the socially desirable outcome 
 
193 See supra Part V.A. Philosophical questions like ‘justice’ would not arise, see generally 
Green, supra note 168, at 554. 
194 Herbert I. Weisberg & Thomas J. Tomberlin, A Statistical Perspective on Actuarial 
Methods for Estimating Pure Premiums from Cross-Classified Data, 49 J. RISK & INS. 539 
(1982); Cheng Hsiao et al., A Statistical Perspective on Insurance Rate-Making, 44 J. 
ECONOMETRICS 5 (1990). 
195 See supra Parts III.B.2. & III.B.3. 
196 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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and the result of the applicable liability regime might be prohibitively 
large.197 Strict liability to the state alone is capable of closing this gap. 
 
iv. Strict Liability to the State beyond AI applications? 
 
If strict liability to the state instills (constantly) socially optimal 
behavior, this regime should be broadly employed for any combination of 
cases of loss even without the engagement of AI. The proposed liability 
regime would always induce the proper incentives to take care and choose 
desirable levels of activity in the context of any accident. But the 
ascertainment of accidents would not be a trivial task. If victims are not 
compensated, they would not have any incentives to sue.198 Further, parties 
involved in an accident would have no advantageous reason to notify the 
state that an accident occurred. It would, in fact, be even an incentive for the 
parties concerned to conceal accidents because all of them are able to jointly 
save a proportionate amount of their own losses.199 However, the special 
future of AI offers the unique capability to report accidents through 
electronic systems, which are able to furnish the public authorities access to 
the gathered information of an accident.200 Already prospering research can 
be conducted on the technical implementation of specific transmitters.201 
Overall, it may not be necessary to entirely reinvent a new agency to ensure 
compliance; rather those already in existence could take over this part. The 
accompanying administrative costs may be low and the chance to circumvent 
the reporting of accidents almost impossible. 
Of course, privacy and data protection rules will have a strong impact on 
the implementation of such a reporting system. Additionally, assessment of 
how to collect, record or store the data of the harm caused by AI systems 
seems advisable. Especially the aspects of traceability and auditability in the 
context of privacy law need specific deliberations. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: A ROADMAP 
 
197 See supra Part III.B.3. 
198 See Posner, supra note 31, at 223 (demonstrating that the incentives for victims to sue is 
elemental to the maintenance of the tort system). 
199 See Green, supra note 168, at 554; Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 30. 
200 See Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 280. 
201 See, e.g., Fizzah Bhatti et al., A Novel Internet of Things-Enabled Accident Detection and 
Reporting System for Smart City Environments, 19 SENSORS 2071 (2019) (research into 
transmitter implementation). 
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Undoubtedly, AI is capable of many further breakthroughs in the years 
and decades to come. As noted, AI strongly influences and challenges tort 
law doctrines. A solid liability regime for efficient and trustworthy AI will 
constitute the foundation to ensure a social welfare optimum and enable a 
frictionless market for further AI development. This contribution allocates 
the opportunity to establish such a flexible normative framework instead of 
a one-size-fits-all system. If the technology is to be used for the benefit of 
society, a framework should lead to the desired result in all different 
scenarios. Ultimately, the U.S. might therefore pursue the following path: 
1. The E.U. initiatives on the differentiation between high-risk AI and 
non-high-risk AI shall only serve as a guideline. Focusing mainly on the 
riskiness of AI instead of sector specific applications could be a desirable 
path. Still, a fostered discussion on a flexible and, at the same time, 
determined distinction is advisable. 
2. Existing tort doctrines are not capable of ensuring a social welfare 
optimum within the application of AI. The E.U. proposal – strict liability 
with the defense of comparative negligence – provides already desirable 
incentives with regard to losses when only one high-risk AI operator is 
involved and shall only cover such circumstances. Especially since each AI 
system can sustain harm in an accident. The E.U. approach should not be 
applied to accidents of several high-risk AI operators. 
3. In scenarios where two or more high-risk AI operators cause harm to 
each other. Tort law doctrines cannot optimally address the emerging issues 
of such AI accidents. The solution is called strict liability with damages paid 
to the state. Payments are made to the state instead of compensating the other 
party involved. Further, to ensure its compliance, the technology shall entail 
an electronical tool to report an event of losses between high-risk AI 
operators automatically. 
In sum, the E.U. declarations are neither a final breakthrough nor a mere 
token of an initial liability regime. These European initiatives do not delve 
into the essential issues – a flexible system that is capable of achieving an 
optimal solution for society in the long run. Overall, it is precisely this 
flexibility that the E.U. draft lacks. Now it is up to the U.S. to be at the 
forefront of AI enhancement, and the aforementioned proposed roadmap 
leads to a desirable path. 
 
